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 Chapter 4 
 Thought-in-Action/Action-in-Thought 
 Gunnar  Olsson 
 An entire volume devoted to the theme of knowledge and action! What a gift and 
what a wonderful opportunity to return once again to the Olsson Laboratory of 
Epistemology and Ontology, to the company of the twin sisters of rhetoric and dia-
lectics, to the mutating banana fl ies that by now have been with me for more than 
half a century. And what a fascinating, non-ending, and interesting adventure those 
years have been, from beginning to end an attempt to understand how we under-
stand, every day steeped in the hope of catching a glimpse of how we become what-
ever we become. 1 
 But wait! What is it to be interesting, and where do I go to fi nd it? As so often 
before, the answer lies in the word itself, for the English term  inter-esting stems 
from the Latin  inter esse , literally  in-between-being . To be interesting is, conse-
quently, to dwell in the razor-sharp limit between categories, to explore the trenches 
of the no-man’s land of the excluded middle. Now, if I am courageous enough to 
enter that crater-strewn wasteland, and if I am curious enough to keep my eyes and 
ears open, then I will eventually encounter a troupe of traveling magicians who to 
great applause are performing their magic tricks of ontological transformations, an 
antiphony of voices, some divine some other human. As the angels keep chanting 
1  In what follows I will draw freely on the history of my own works, occasionally even quoting 
without quotation marks. In addition to the texts listed toward the end of this chapter, there is much 
to learn from  GO: On the Geographies of Gunnar Olsson , a remarkable anthology edited by 
Christian Abrahamsson and Martin Gren ( 2012 ). It contains not only a representative selection of 
facsimile reproductions of some of my own articles from 1967 to 2010 but also some brilliant 
illuminations set off by a long list of fi rst-rate pyrotechnists: Christian Abrahamsson, Trevor 
Barnes, Alessandra Bonazzi, Michael Dear, Marcus Doel, Franco Farinelli, Reginald Golledge, 
Martin Gren, Jette Hansen-Møller, David Jansson, Gunnael Jensson, Ole Michael Jensen, Tom 
Mels, Chris Philo, Michael Watts. And I who always fancied myself as a Wittgensteinian solipsist! 
Stand corrected, identity crisis in the making, Paulus Gunnarius on the road to Damascus. 
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their wor(l)ds of “Let there be—and there was,” the plebeians respond that “ Verum 
factum —the true is the made,” indeed that to them something is true because they 
have made it themselves. And in that perspective both Jahweh and Giambattista 
Vico come out as what they really are—expert jugglers of worlds which from one 
viewpoint are and from another are not, true creativity in both cases nothing but a 
speech act through which the powerful can claim that something is something else 
and be believed when they do so. Knowledge is by defi nition an exercise in 
translation. 
 “What, then, is truth?” asked Nietzsche in his essay  On Truth and Lie , immedi-
ately replying that truth is
 a mobile army of metaphors, metonyms, and anthropomorphisms—in short, a sum of 
human relations, which have been enhanced, transposed, and embellished poetically and 
rhetorically, and which after long use seem fi rm, canonical, and obligatory to a people: 
truths are illusions about which one has forgotten that this is what they are; metaphors 
which are worn out and without sensuous power. (Penguin edition, 1976, pp. 46–47) 
 Whereas the self-declared LORD created the world by uttering it—light and 
darkness, mountains and rivers, you and me, everything fl owing out of his mouth—
the humpbacked Vico was a Neapolitan professor of rhetoric it is not only to 
American pragmatists that meaning lies in practice and the paradigm of informative 
truth in the fi nger-pointing index of  a = b . The Kantian  as-if at work. Yet we must 
never forget that although words may well change people, to things they do 
nothing. 
 What follows will be structured as a retracing of routes taken, essentially a col-
lage of vistas glimpsed in the distance. Nothing new, merely a dose of coherence 
dashed into a cocktail which to the afi cionados has been a source of intoxicating 
enlightenment, to the doubters a drug of impure ingredients and frightening side- 
effects. The recommended antidote is a product of the Nicomachean Pharmacy, 
delivery a mouse-click away:
 It is the mark of an educated man to look for precision in each class of things just so far as 
the nature of the subject admits; it is evidently equally foolish to accept probable reasoning 
from a mathematician and to demand from a rhetorician scientifi c proofs. 
 Now each man judges well the things he knows, and of these he is a good judge. And so 
the man who has been educated in a subject is a good judge of that subject, and the man who 
has received an all-round education is a good judge in general. Hence a young man is not a 
proper hearer of lectures on political science; for he is inexperienced in the actions that 
occur in life, but its discussions start from these and are about these; and, further, since he 
tends to follow his passions, his study will be in vain and unprofi table, because the end is 
not knowledge but action. And it makes no difference whether he is young in years or 
youthful in character; the defect does not depend on time, but on his living, and pursuing 
each successive object, as passion directs. 
 [These] remarks about the student, the sort of treatment to be expected, and the purpose 
of the inquiry, may be taken as our preface. (Aristotle, trans.  1941 , Book 1, Chapter 3, 
1094b and 1095a) 
 ***  
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 Beware though, for the fact that the young man is young does not mean that he is 
a  tabula rasa . On the contrary, because like everyone else he is a product of his own 
upbringing: a palimpsest of impressions, layers upon layers of indicatives and 
imperatives; a ceaselessly over-painted canvas onto which the world is casting 
whatever it is casting; a self-referential story composed in a mixed code of genetics 
and socialization, its nonachievable purpose to make us obedient and predictable, to 
turn you and me into exchangeable, yet unique, pieces in the ongoing game of one 
against many, us versus them. It is these traces of the taken-for-granted that function 
as an invisible map of the invisible, a library of the unconscious, a nontouchable 
guide that leads me through the unknown, rewards and punishments distributed 
along the way. And as the explorer now moves on, (s)he gradually realizes not only 
that the fi rst-person singular is the linguistic shifter par excellence but that this same 
 I is the cartographers’ fi x-point of fi x-points. Little wonder, therefore, that the world 
refuses to sit still, for when pushed to the interesting limit of in-between-being I 
discover that I am one with my own map, its coordinate net constructed as the asym-
metric body of Leonardo’s Vitruvian man, head up and feet down, eyes in front and 
arse in the back, left hand to the left, the right to the right. Thus, therefore, spake 
Zarathustra: “You say ‘I’ and you are proud of this word. But greater than this—
although you will not believe in it—is your body which does not say ‘I’ but per-
forms ‘I’” (Nietzsche  1976 , p. 146; my rendering, Olsson,  1991 , p. 122). Body 
politics undressed, for most will agree that it is more honest to preach as you live 
than to live as you preach. 
 A circling tale of no beginning and no end, the taken-for-granted present every-
where, visible nowhere. Thus it would indeed be strange if not I too were a product 
of my own time and place, in this case the Swedish welfare state of the postwar 
decades. And even though by heritage, choice, and inclination I was never drawn to 
the Social Democratic Party per se, it is impossible not to be impressed by its vision 
of equality and social justice, including the idea that the bright new world should be 
erected on a foundation of causal theories and well-calibrated models. Such were 
the 1950s and early 1960s: the high noon of social engineering, the dream of a 
happy marriage between scientifi c knowledge and political action come true, the 
maximizing principles of utilitarian ethics institutionalized, Alva and Gunnar 
Myrdal the high priests in a congregation of politically anchored experts who took 
it as their mission to turn Sweden into a People’s Home, a state of rationality in 
which the physical infrastructure (not least the architecture of the living quarters, 
especially the kitchens and the communal washing-rooms) was designed to ensure 
that the users would have no choice but to behave accordingly, at bottom a positivist 
belief that the road to mental hygiene and proper thinking goes via the body, an 
ideology well captured by Axel Hägerström’s ( 1911 ) rejection of metaphysics and 
his advocacy of value nihilism—his well-known motto  praetera censeo metaphysi-
cam esse delendam , a paraphrase of Cato’s “Carthage must be destroyed.” But not 
everyone was born with genes deemed good enough for the future, an argument 
which was readily extended to the widespread practice of forced sterilization. 
 Zeitgeist is the term, in the same breath an excuse and an accusation, for “when I 
obey a rule, I do not choose. I obey the rule  blindly ” (Wittgenstein,  1953 , p. 219). 
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 To the budding geographer the time-bound message could not be misunderstood: 
Capture the power of social relations in a net of scientifi c laws and then, like your 
friends in physics, chemistry, and medicine, you too will have acquired the means 
not merely for understanding the world but for changing it as well. If the natural 
scientists know how to construct rockets that take them to the moon, if they know 
how to generate energy by enriching uranium, if they know how to save lives by 
transplanting hearts, then your duty as a social scientist is to discover similar tech-
niques for eradicating poverty! Before you accept that challenge, though, be sure to 
ask yourself fi rst why no one now reads Plato and Aristotle for what they had to say 
about physics or medicine, then why so many continue to return to the plays of 
Sophocles and Shakespeare for their insights into the human condition of hopes and 
fears, love and hate. How does the circumstance that we have accumulated knowl-
edge in some areas and not in others relate to Aristotle’s remark that we should look 
for precision in each class of things just as far as the nature of the subject admits and 
that it would be equally foolish to accept probable reasoning from a mathematician 
as to demand scientifi c proofs from a rhetorician? 
 No small order given to a young man inexperienced in the actions that occur in 
life and therefore prone to pursue each object as passion directs. And yet, how could 
I possibly have ignored the challenge? GO ON, GO ON.
 *  
 The list of required readings included the classics of location theory, cognitive 
science, decision theory, systems analysis, matrix algebra, probability theory, spa-
tial statistics, and a sprinkle of historical geography, all of it somehow yoked 
together in Walter Isard’s conception of Regional Science and its extension into 
Peace Science, the latter fi rmly anchored in the Quaker-thin interface of scientifi c 
knowledge and political action, John Dewey’s pragmatism and the collections of the 
Barnes Foundation never far away. A formative experience it was, the handsome 
fellowship that in 1963–1964 took me to North Armorica and the intellectual hubs 
of the Wharton School, Berkeley, and Northwestern. 
 Great. Yet, in hindsight, the seeds might well have been planted 10 years earlier 
by the odd gymnasium teacher who did whatever he could to introduce his rowdy 
pupils to the concentric rings of von Thünen’s isolated state and the cost curves of 
Alfred Weber’s isodapanes. Perhaps I was the only one to pay attention, but the truth 
is that I can still feel in my body the boy’s excitement when he literally  saw why 
there were so many gauchos on the Pampas and so many steel mills along the Ruhr. 
The rhetorical power of geometric construction on the high wire, von Thünen’s 
agricultural landscape depicted as an archer’s target with the bull’s eye as the central 
city on a homogeneous plain (more correctly the Junker’s own estate), Weber’s fac-
tory fi nding its place of least cost, the Archimedean point that is located at the center 
of a Euclidean triangle whose corners are the concepts of transportation, labor, and 
agglomeration. Deep roots it has, the subsequent defi nition of geography as a geom-
etry with names, essentially an exercise in the drawing and baptizing of points, 
lines, and planes. Picture and story merged into one. 
G. Olsson
71
 So there it is, the glue of socialization decomposed: Vico’s  verum factum —the 
true and the made are convertible—long before I knew the name; Wassily 
Kandinsky’s abstract expressionism as a social scientifi c practice years ahead of my 
fi rst visit to Dessau; Euclid’s  Quod Erat Demonstrandum overruled by his  Quod 
Erat Faciendum —that which was to be demonstrated overruled by that which was 
to be shown—the beliefs of the former lodged in the socialized mind, the convic-
tions of the latter in the individual body. These fi x-points revealed, I can now better 
understand why once upon a time every Swedish school room was equipped with a 
blackboard, a ruler, a compass, and a square, these four implements serving as the 
teacher’s pedagogical tools par excellence, to every generation after Plato the very 
key to understanding how we understand. In that context of knowledge creation, it 
should also be added that Immanuel Kant— the philosopher of limits—often referred 
to his own work as a form of architecture. In my mind the three Critiques may prof-
itably be read as a report from the masterbuilder’s experiments with different con-
struction materials, one cement for the palace of pure reason, another for the house 
of practice, a third for the court of judgment. 
 And this interplay of reasoning modes is exactly why August Lösch’s  Die räum-
liche Ordnung der Wirtschaft (1943/ 1954 ) is such a groundbreaking book and why 
he himself was such an exceptionally interesting person, the confl ict between 
Jahweh and Vico embodied. As the 33-year-old put it in the fateful autumn of 1939:
 The natural equilibrium of economics differs from the equilibrium of nature exactly as the 
moral differs from the mechanical. Nature works according to laws, but man acts according 
to his  idea of laws. In other words, nature  must , man  may , act correctly. In order to do so he 
must have some conception of how he shall act. As to economic equilibrium this means that 
 in order to guide his activities he needs insight into the conditions of this equilibrium . This 
is especially true for the lawmaker, since all others are bound by his precepts even though 
unable to perceive their rationality. (p. 93, emphasis in the original) 
 With that link between knowledge and action fi rmly established, Lösch then pro-
ceeded to the formulation of a general theory of location, a derivation based on the 
principle of profi t maximization rather than cost minimization, the lattice of nested 
hexagons its most spectacular outcome. As he put it in the book’s preface, the math-
ematical calculations are there “because it is reprehensible not to trust reason and 
rest content with vague words and hazy statements” (p. xv). Heaving a sigh of relief 
that the number of equations coincided with the number of unknowns, he neverthe-
less exclaimed: “If only we had a method that combined the generality of equations 
with the clarity of geometrical fi gures!” (p. 100) 
 The rhetorical point is well taken: If I want to be believed, it is not enough to tell 
a trustworthy story, I must also know how to paint the picture that goes with it. 
Rephrased, the credibility of a given argument is immensely increased if it is 
expressed not only in one but in both of the major modes of communication. 
Therefore,
 theory may be compared with reality for various ends, according to the sort of theory held. 
If it is to  explain what actually is, the examination attempts to discover whether it started 
with a correct idea of its subject and arrived at an explanation that not only seemed possible 
but also corresponded with reality. On the other hand, if theory is to  construct what is 
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 rational, its assumptions may still be tested by facts, but not its results. Its author can dis-
cover from an examination of the facts whether he has built on adequately broad experi-
ence, whether he has taken all objective or subjective essentials into consideration. His 
procedure resembles the preliminary work of an architect, who cannot lightly neglect the 
characteristics of a site, the laws of nature, and the wishes of the owner. But a comparison 
with existing structures will not show whether his blueprints are accurate; in our case, that 
is, whether the theoretical structure has been properly erected. For the existing structure 
may be as faulty as the projected one. No!  Comparison now has to be drawn no longer to 
test the theory, but to test reality! (Lösch, 1943/ 1954 , pp. 363–364, emphasis added) 
 German idealism lodged in a thinker who has been described as
 a combination of rare strength of character, intellect, and warmth of personality, [a man] 
who died shortly after the end of the hostilities on May 30, 1945, at least partially as the 
result of that very strength of character which forbade him to make any compromises with 
the National Socialist regime. (Hoover in Lösch, 1943/ 1954 , p. vii) 
 His hands tied, it was the mind that carried him back to the place where his uncon-
scious had been formed. In Lösch’s own words:
 It was not easy for me largely to forego the attractive task of applying what has thus been 
tested to our more complicated German conditions and analyzing the pertinent facts. But 
apart from all foreign studies [mainly based on U.S. data] and the wide applicability of the 
resulting ideas, my youthful experiences in a little Swabian town constitute the real back-
ground of this book. [To] have my original experiences there confi rm my fi nal theories 
gives me a real sense of security, and so I dedicate this book to the land of my birth, the land 
that I love. (Lösch, 1943/ 1954 , pp. xv–xvi) 
 It is diffi cult not to cry, especially if one compares the fate of Lösch’s life and 
work (1906–1945) with that of Walter Christaller (1898–1969), the fi rst edition of 
Lösch’s  Die räumliche Ordnung der Wirtschaft appearing in 1940, the second edi-
tion in 1943, Christaller’s  Die zentralen Orte in Süddeutschland in  1933 . In the 
present context of thought-in-action, it is simply impossible to ignore the fact that 
whereas Lösch paid a high price for his refusal to swear a personal oath of alle-
giance to the Führer, Christaller’s political views (hence by extension his built-in 
attitudes to intentional action) were fl uttering in the wind, like the LORD himself 
consistently inconsistent. The record is there for anyone to inspect. First, the 
trenches of World War I turned Christaller into a card-carrying Social Democrat. 
Second, in the summer of 1934, when that party had been banned, he fl ed on his 
bicycle to the liberty of France, from where he was promptly lured back to a job 
offered him by Konrad Meyer, an SS professor of agronomy, who already at that 
stage was working directly under Heinrich Himmler. Third, in the summer of 1940 
Christaller joined the National Socialist Party (membership number 8 375 670). 
Fourth, immediately after the war that same(?) person enrolled as a member of the 
West German Communist Party and in 1953 was accused of collaborating with his 
comrades in the DDR. Fifth, after 14 years as a Communist he resurrected himself 
as a Social Democrat, just in time for his plenary lecture at the historic meeting of 
the International Geographical Union Symposium in Urban Geography in Lund, 
Sweden, in August 1960. To only partial avail, however, for even though the conver-
sion might have paved the way to an honorary doctorate at Lund, it failed to get him 
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the visa that would have taken him to the United States and the lecture tour of his 
life. Broken was the icon when the young man met him about 5 years before he 
passed away, the sadness of his eyes forever etched into my memory. 
 Water in water, a palimpsest hard to decipher, a mille-feuille bound to cause 
indigestion. But who am I to judge? What does a Swede born in 1935 know of blar-
ing sirens, exploding bombs, ruins, terror, death camps, starving children without 
shoes? As so often before, I am once again drawn into Wittgenstein’s struggle with 
solipsism:
 I am my world. There is no such thing as the subject that thinks or entertains ideas. If I 
wrote a book called  The World as I found it, I should have to include a report on my body, 
and should have to say which parts were subordinate to my will, and which were not, etc.,… 
The subject does not belong to the world: rather it is a limit of the world.... There is no  a 
priori order of things. (Wittgenstein, 1921/ 1961 , 5.63–5.632, 5.634) 
 ***  
 Drawing the limits of the world is exactly what the joint history of human geog-
raphy and regional planning is about. And in that essentially political enterprise 
references to central place theory have often been used to legitimate some drastic 
intrusions into the daily lives of entire populations. All for their own good, of course. 
 For understanding these connections between text and context, it is important to 
know that Christaller’s and Lösch’s shared goal was to detail how a given area is 
colonized or settled, especially how a set of hierarchically nested and hexagonally 
distributed centers are (or, more accurately,  should be) tied together into a func-
tional whole. In that sense they were more immediately concerned with the geom-
etry of the stage than with the actors’ movements across it, more focused on 
scenography than on dialogue. The outcome was in both cases a script of power. 
And for that reason the critic should never forget that
 what distinguishes the worst architect from the best of bees is that the architect raises his 
structure in the imagination before he erects it in reality. At the end of every labor-process, 
we get a result that already existed in the imagination of the laborer at its commencement. 
He not only effects a change of form in the material on which he works, but he also realizes 
a purpose of his own that gives the law to his modus operandi, and to which he must subor-
dinate his will. (Marx, 1867/ 1967 , vol. I, p. 178) 
 An outstanding example comes from the Dutch polders, lands reclaimed from 
the sea and therefore at constant risk of being fl ooded. That likelihood must, of 
course, be carefully controlled and the condition of the dikes and pumps minutely 
monitored, a duty which since the eleventh century has been entrusted to an espe-
cially elected local authority appropriately called the  Hoogheemraadschap . By law 
a modus operandi to which everyone must subordinate their will, the oldest demo-
cratic institution in the country. 
 These newly reclaimed lands are obviously both fl at and nonpopulated, hence as 
close to the theoreticians’ conception of a homogeneous plain as any social engineer 
could ever dream of. And exactly as the Marx quotation suggests, the planners actu-
ally  did raise the structure of the new villages, towns, and cities in their imagination 
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before they erected them in reality, a wonderful illustration of how the abstractness 
of Platonic forms is turned into the concreteness of visible objects. Seemingly a 
textbook application of practical reason, the intentionality of the plan preserved in 
the materiality of physical structures. Only seemingly, though, for in the case of the 
early Zuiderzee polders the impact of technological change was seriously underes-
timated. To make a long and complicated story short and simple, the constructed 
places proved to be too many, too small, and too closely packed, the location of the 
brick-built stores, schools, police stations, and hospitals obsolete before the mortar 
had dried. In addition, and because roads and houses are costly both to build and to 
tear down, the spatial nonoptimality tends to stick.  The Achilles-heal of every opti-
mizing location theory. 
 Lösch’s remarks about the comparison between rational theory and faulty reality 
come readily to mind, Hegel’s epistemology of self-conscious reevaluation as well. 
The reason is that the planning of the later polders, especially the Oostelijk and the 
Zuidelijks Flevolands, has become increasingly sophisticated. But that development 
rather heightens than lessens my surprise that Christaller’s static, deterministic, and 
inelegant theory was used at all. The only excuse I can think of is that we are all 
children of our own time and place, the Dutchmen of 1930 as much as I at eighty. 
And what a happy circumstance that is. For what saved the subjects of the great 
polder project was not the machinations of social engineering but the circumstance 
that Holland is an open society, its citizens free to design their honeycombs as their 
fancy fancies. 
 In that respect the Third Reich was obviously different. But what richer pasture 
could the likes of Konrad Meyer and Walter Christaller have wished for than the 
newly conquered  Lebensraum (living space) of Eastern Europe, a vast area show-
ered down on them as a gift from the Führer’s heaven. Like the Dutch polders, also 
the territory that the  Reichskommissariat für die Festigung deutschen Volkstums 
(Reich Commission for German Resettlement and Population Policy) was commis-
sioned to settle had the characteristics of a homogeneous plain, the techniques of 
ethnic cleansing as merciless in Poland, Lithuania, Belarus, and Ukraine as any-
where else. The clearing of suffi cient living space in the East was de facto  the cor-
nerstone of Nazi foreign policy, the very precondition for the Germanization that 
was meant to follow, the  Entfernung (removal) of foreign elements setting the stage 
as effectively as the digging of the dikes in Holland. As an amateur artist, Hitler 
surely knew that without a properly prepared canvas there will never be any paint-
ing. And as the Leader of a populist movement he was well aware that no political 
battle is more decisive than that about the boundary between identity and difference, 
one and many, us and them, me and you. Such was consequently also the purpose of 
the charts, tables, and maps that came out of Meyer’s offi ce: the utopia of a totalitar-
ian  Herrschaft (rule) projected into optimally located settlements, everything and 
everyone in its proper place. Seventy-fi ve years later the whole affair strikes me as 
a Dadaesque blend of Kandinsky’s Bauhaus, Malevich’s suprematism, Picasso’s 




 The outline of this new world was drawn in  Generalplan Ost (General Plan for 
the East), a strictly confi dential document prepared in the period 1939–1942, delib-
erately destroyed in May 1945 lest it be used as incriminating evidence, by later 
historians eventually pieced together again. It consisted of two parts, the Small Plan 
which covered actions to be taken during the  Blitzkrieg , and the  Big Plan which 
outlined what was to follow in the 30-year period thereafter. The text of the latter is 
simply too much for sensible analysis (a total of 31 million undesirables to be 
moved to West Siberia, the remaining to be treated as slaves), but the fi gures of the 
former are even more staggering. (Between October 12 and December 31, 1939, 
about 1,700,000 Jews and Poles were actually deported to places with names now 
well known, another fi ve million classifi ed as unsuitable for assimilation.) The 
machinelike horrors of the  Entfernung set the stage not merely for what was  meant 
to come but for what actually  did come. 
 It is now well established that Walter Christaller was directly involved in the 
German settling of Warthegau, the Polish territory occupied by the German forces 
in September 1939—a story forcefully told by Barnes ( 2015 ) and much elaborated 
in the works of Bauman ( 1989 ), Kamenetzky ( 1961 ), Madajcyk ( 1994 ), Rössler 
( 1989 ), and many others. A moment of truth for any theoretician eager to see his 
abstract imaginations metamorphosed into concrete reality. Yet nothing compared 
to what was to come with Christaller’s appointment to the staff of Konrad Meyer, 
the mentor who under Himmler’s personal supervision was charged with the task of 
fi nalizing the plans for the still unconquered  Lebensraum . Included in the directives 
was the megalomaniac idea of a fortifi ed string of SS garrisons and “pearl settle-
ments” that would run all the way from Arkhangelsk on the Northern Dvina River 
to Astrakan in the Volga delta, the  Übermenschen (superior humans) in the west 
securely separated from the  Untermenschen (subhumans) in the east. The surviving 
records occasionally refer to Christaller’s theory, but there is no explicit mention of 
any detailed plans; who knows, perhaps they were not Aryan enough. Crucial 
indeed, for every judgment of guilt and punishment should be based on the here- 
and- now of particular circumstances, not on the there-and-then of general princi-
pals. On the surface a matter of alternative descriptions, deeper down an entangled 
skein of modal logics. 
 It is the struggle with the latter that now brings me to the intricacies of the word 
 can , like all modal verbs of vital importance to any critique of power, by extension, 
to any worthwhile understanding of the relations between knowledge and action 
(Ofstad,  1961 , pp. 328–337; see also Olsson,  1980 , pp. 118b–115b). The reason is 
that the “all-in can” (forty-seven of them) is essentially a combination of two “sub- 
cans,” one denoting ability, the other opportunity. For instance, there is no doubt that 
Walter Christaller already in 1933 knew how to deduce an optimal settlement pat-
tern from a set of (un)realistic assumptions, but it was only after Hitler’s  Drang 
nach Osten (drive toward the east) that he got a chance to apply his knowledge and 
in that manner show the world who he really was. Hand in glove, a temptation hard 
to resist, a mixture of pleasures and nightmares, a situation he shared with many 
others, Martin Heidegger most prominent among them. The pivotal question is, of 
course, whether, given the circumstances, he could have acted otherwise. If not, he 
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should not be held responsible, regardless of his political (in)stability. Purgatory has 
many chambers, and in some congregations you get to Paradise because of your 
beliefs, in others because of your deeds. “In this connection,” wrote Albert Speer 
(1969/ 1970 ) in a passage of direct relevance for the assessment of spatial 
planning,
 I must mention [Hitler’s] plan for founding German cities in the occupied areas of the 
Soviet Union. On November 24, 1941, in the very midst of the winter catastrophe, Gauleiter 
Meyer [Alfred, not Konrad], deputy of Alfred Rosenberg, the Reich Minister for the occu-
pied eastern territories, asked me to take over the section on ‘new cities’ and plan and build 
the settlements for the German garrisons and civil administrations. I fi nally refused this 
offer at the end of 1942 on the grounds that a central authority for the city planning would 
inevitably lead to a uniform pattern. I insisted instead that the great German cities each 
stand as sponsor for the construction of the new ones. (p. 182) 
 For Oberführer Konrad Meyer-Hertling the situation was less clear. Like Speer, 
he too was convicted at Nuremberg, but unlike the genius of organizational dynam-
ics, his crimes were deemed so small that immediately after the trial he was set free 
for time served, a whitewash paper written by Walter Christaller being part of the 
evidence. In the judges’ opinion Meyer’s contribution to  Generalplan Ost was “a 
strictly independent scientifi c study” (Rössler,  1989 , p. 427)—in Marx’s dialectics 
something imagined that never made it into reality; in my own terminology, an 
ontological transformation aborted. 
 No serious wrong-doing proven and in 1956 the University of Hanover appointed 
Meyer Professor Ordinarius (full professor) of Land Planning, a post he occupied 
until his retirement. The pragmatism of expert knowledge and political action 
undressed, H. C. Andersen’s emperor as he must have appeared to the lackeys, who 
continued to carry the fabulous train that did not exist. The boys in the gutter saw it 
differently. For even though they had never attended Meyer’s and Christaller’s alma 
maters, they still knew that ethics is the only ordered discourse that has thought- 
and- action as its defi ning subject matter. In addition, they were soon to learn the 
Foucauldian lesson that it is in the prison and madhouse that we discover what is 
normal, indeed what it means to be human. As Arendt ( 1977 ) put it, there are strong 
streaks of banality in evil; the institutions of modernity a precondition for the 
Holocaust. It is telling that Heidegger’s postwar critique of technology paid much 
attention to the verb  can and its tendency to turn into a  may , the  may into an  ought , 
the  ought into a  shall , the  shall into a  must .
 ***  
 Mind-boggling are the German vignettes, the offered interpretations part and 
parcel of the same epistemology of extremity that for 50 years has served me so 
well. Come to think of it, it may well be that same attitude that has made me less 
responsive to the political calls for changing the world and more focused on the hid-
den in my own taken-for-granted, the latter the only critique that to my solipsist 
mind is honest enough. That remark is obviously not an excuse for the shallowness 
of what I have just written about Hitler, Himmler, Meyer, and Christaller, merely a 
way of saying that it is by detecting the beam in my neighbor’s eye that I become 
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aware of the mote in my own. And what a painful experience that is, learning to roll 
with the punches, a technique which Marlene Dietrich practiced to perfection:
 It’s not cause I wouldn’t 
 It’s not cause I shouldn’t 
 And you know it’s not cause I couldn’t 
 It’s simply because I’m the laziest gal in town. 
 In that mood I shall now proceed to the spatial set-up of the Swedish welfare 
state. As Shakespeare (1602/ n.d. ) put it in  The Merry Wives of Windsor , “the world’s 
mine oyster, Which I with sword will open” (Act II, Scene II, 2–3).
 *  
 The story goes a long way back, not least to Gustav Eriksson Vasa, the guerilla 
leader who in 1523 threw the Danes out, united the Swedes into one country, and let 
himself be elected king to crown it off. Once that goal had been achieved, he faced 
the problem of paying back the money he had borrowed to fi nance his campaign, a 
problem he solved by confi scating the riches of the Church, converting to the 
Lutheran faith, and translating the Bible in the process. An expert in Machiavellian 
rhetoric and the logistics of tax collection, he penetrated so deeply into the minds of 
his subjects that a Swede of the twentieth century readily recognizes the similarities. 
 Allt förändras, allt förblir ändå det samma , or, as the French have it,  Plus ça change, 
plus ça reste la mȇme chose , alternatively, the more things change, the more they 
stay the same. In the farewell speech Gustav gave to Parliament on June 16, 1560:
 I know that in the minds of many I have been a harsh king. But the times shall come when 
the children of Sweden will want to tear me up from the ground, were that within their 
might. I also know that the Swedes are quick to agree and late to question. I predict that 
many pretenders and false prophets will be forthcoming. Therefore I beg and advise you: 
Stick fi rmly to God’s words. Listen carefully to your superiors and stand united together. 
My days will soon be gone. For telling me that I need neither stars nor any other sorcery. I 
feel in my body the signs that I will soon be taken away. Follow me then with your sincere 
prayers and, when I have closed my eyes, let my body rest in peace. (Retrieved November 
10, 2015, from  http://sv.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vasakoret , my translation) 
 Quick to agree and late to question, well organized by their superiors. 
 Following in his grandfather’s footsteps was Gustavus Adolphus, in 1632 killed 
in the mist-enveloped battle at Lützen, his military forays clearly proving that 
Sweden from then on was a power to reckon with. The road to success was forged 
by his genial chancellor, Axel Oxenstierna, the man who invented the administrative 
set-up that made it all possible, its basic outline still with us. 
 It is this historical stickiness that now prompts me back to the 1950s and some 
fundamental problems which Christaller’s theory was then called upon to settle. To 
put it very simply, the old parishes and communes—often with boundaries 
unchanged since Oxenstierna’s time—was a harness too small for the expanding 
welfare state. Something had to be done, and on January 1, 1952, the number of 
rural communes was cut from 2281 to 816. Not enough, however, and 10 years later 
a new and wider reform was set in motion, the number of communes (including the 
towns and cities) presently down to 290. 
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 These administrative reforms have had a revolutionary impact on the daily life of 
every Swede, the redrawing of the political boundaries directly related to the where, 
when, and how you happen to be born; to the when, where, and how you will even-
tually die; to every whatever that may or may not lie in-between. The underlying 
ideology is, of course, that just as all citizens should have equal rights regardless of 
whether they are rich or poor, so the same should hold regardless of where they hap-
pen to live. No small deal but a tacit admission that the whereness of spatial form 
bears directly on the whatness of social relations. Whether form follows function or 
function follows form is in that perspective a moot point, the geographer’s inference 
problem when it matters. 
 The blueprint of this brave new world was drawn by a politically appointed com-
mittee supported by a set of experts, the result submitted to the Minister of the 
Interior as number 1961:9 of  Statens Offentliga Utredningar —The State’s Offi cial 
Investigations. The pivotal parts of this document were written by Sven Godlund 
and Torsten Hägerstrand, two up-to-date geographers who explicitly anchored their 
reasoning in Christaller’s theory. Their basic argument was that whereas the drastic 
changes in transportation technology had led to novel forms of shopping behavior 
and thereby to the spontaneous establishment of larger market areas, the administra-
tive units were legally sanctioned leftovers from a previous era—the commercial 
system was effi cient, open, and modern; the legal was outdated, closed, and obso-
lete. The committee therefore recommended that the boundaries of the latter should 
be redrawn to coincide with the hinterlands of the former. And in that twist from the 
economist’s  is to the politician’s  ought , the play was changed in the middle of the 
act, the utopian dreams of justice disappearing in the wings, fatally stabbed by the 
reality it was supposed to replace. Exit man with his precious visions, hopes, and 
fears. Enter the Thiessen polygons with their crude distance minimizations and 
cost-benefi t ratios. Ideology and methodology in profound and irresolvable 
confl ict. 
 The root of the problem lies in the social gravity model, a formulation which in 
the heydays of the 1960s lay at the frontier of quantitative geography, the page- 
turner of my own conception of thought-in-action and action-in-thought. Although 
originally conceived as an analogue to Newton’s law of gravitation—the interaction 
between two objects directly proportional to the size of their masses and inversely 
proportional to the square of the distance between them—its social science applica-
tion a special case of Vilfredo Pareto’s optimality principle, the latter a sociological 
generalization with deep roots in the mathematics of the negative exponential (see, 
e.g., Arrow,  1951 ; Sen,  1993 ). The irony is that even though Pareto, Hägerstrand, 
and Godlund knew perfectly well that they were describing the world as it was, 
Italian fascists and Swedish democrats read their texts as recipes for how a better 
world could be constructed. As Marx put it, the philosophers have hitherto only 
interpreted the world, the point is to change it. This (mis)reading was in no way 
inevitable, for Pareto argued very explicitly that observed behavior belongs to the 
same category of “logical action” as economic profi t maximization, Machiavellian 
politics, and scientifi c work. But to sanctify observed behavior as logical action is 
nothing but a rhetorical technique for legitimating the status quo. The history of the 
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social gravity model provides an excellent example, for although in the beginning it 
was treated as a formulation of great explanatory power, later generations have 
come to see it as an expression of autocorrelation. As Tobler’s ( 1970 ) fi rst law of 
geography has it, “everything is related to everything else, but near things are more 
related than distant things” (p. 236). A planning tool tailor-made for unintended side 
effects. 
 In that perspective Pareto’s conception of logic appears just as narrow as the 
dogma of any other religion. Rather than perpetuating the belief that the reasoning 
rules represent objective and unassailable a priori principles, we must therefore con-
stantly remind ourselves that they are neither ethically nor aesthetically neutral. If 
we are prepared for that volte-face, then we too, like Vico, Nietzsche, and Heidegger 
before us, will discover how it is grammar that tells us what kind of object anything 
is, not the other way around. As a consequence, we will then understand that the 
role of all languages, deductive logic included, is not to furnish labels for the objects 
we are talking  about but to shape the categories we are thinking and talking  in . And 
thus it is by no coincidence that the tautological  a = a is the linchpin of conventional 
logic just as the evasive  I am who I am is the self-proclaimed name of God the 
Father. And so it is that every concept is a tool of human making, intelligible only 
in the context of our personal and social lives. 
 If we dare not admit that our analytical languages have these characteristics, then 
we run the risk of imposing on reality a strictness that it neither has nor ought to 
have. And if in our many-facetted roles as experts, citizens, and social engineers we 
choose to ignore this hallmark of critical theory, then we will inevitably produce a 
society that both mirrors the techniques by which we measure it and echoes the 
languages in which we talk about it. By extension a dystopia of human puppets with 
no dreams to dream and nothing to be sorry for. And thus it is that Pareto’s  ought 
cohabits with the  is of the elite, exactly as it was propagated in the ethical theory of 
Hägerström ( 1911 ; see also Marc-Wogau,  1968 ) and the legal principles of 
Lundstedt ( 1932 –1936) and Olivecrona ( 1942 ), legitimating shapers of Swedish 
ideology. The outcome is that the law of large numbers rules supreme, the emerging 
relations between individual and collective a classic case of double bind. And in that 
sense the negative exponential serves the purposes of populists and elitists alike. 
The utilitarians should be more cautious, for it is the very kernel of their ethics that 
every act should be judged in terms of its consequences, not in terms of the inten-
tions behind it.
 *  
 The statistics are equivocal, especially when it comes to education and health 
care, by all accounts key ingredients of any welfare system. Thus, there is general 
agreement that the Swedish school system is in deep crisis, the results no longer at 
the top of the evaluations generated by the OECD’s Programme for International 
Student Assessment (PISA) but regularly below average and steadily sliding; among 
the 40 countries listed in the 2013 evaluation, Sweden is ranked as number 36 in 
reading and 38 in mathematics. Little wonder that in a press release (May 4, 2015) 
the OECD concluded that
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 Sweden has failed to improve its school system despite a series of reforms in recent years. 
A more ambitious, national reform strategy is now urgently needed to improve quality and 
equity in education....No other country taking part in PISA has a steeper decline. (Retrieved 
November 10, 2015, from par. 1–2,  http://www.oecd.org/Sweden/Sweden-should-urgently- 
reform-its-school-system-to-improve-quality-and-equity.htm ) 
 Much to mourn but most alarming are the fi gures that Swedish eighth-graders’ 
command of mathematics is now at the same level as that of seventh graders’ a 
decade earlier and that one quarter of the boys fail to comprehend what they are 
reading. The social and economic inequalities are following suit, a new class of 
unemployables growing up, a development most pronounced in the ethnically seg-
regated areas of Malmö and Stockholm. Counterfi nality is the term for the mis-
match between intentionality and consequence, the infected sore of utilitarian ethics 
and the source of an intense debate with immediate ties to the administrative reforms 
of the 1960s. The turning point came in 1991 when the political  cum administrative 
responsibility for the schools was shifted from the state to the local municipalities, 
a reorganization that in one stroke—and very deliberately—lowered the status of 
the teachers. The result is that more than half of them are offi cially unqualifi ed for 
their jobs! An ocean liner to turn around, the  Titanic heading for the iceberg. 
 In the meantime the health-care system is struggling with an attitudinal problem 
of its own. To be precise, the 2011 Commonwealth Fund International Health Policy 
Survey of eleven comparable countries placed Sweden at the bottom of the list in 
terms of health-care availability. Similar fi gures hold for the sense of dignity, 
respect, and empathy that the patients thought they had the right to expect but did 
not receive, one third of the doctors demonstrating that they knew little or nothing 
about their clients’ medical history. Since with growing age we tend to forget fi rst 
what we learned last, many immigrants from the 1950s, now in nursing homes, have 
lost their Swedish and are therefore, unbeknownst to themselves, reverting back to 
their mother tongues, idioms typically unknown to their helpers. Sadder than sad, 
the art of dying a question of  chairos rather than  chronos , an issue of the right 
moment rather than the orderlies’ work schedule. But just as eugenics is not eutha-
nasia, so euthanasia is not suicide. 
 In the meantime all surveys agree that although everyone considers the level of 
expert medicine to be outstanding, the proportion of patients who doubt that they 
are receiving the best treatment available is higher in Sweden than in any of the 
comparable countries, the sense of shared trust no longer what it used to be. To put 
it bluntly, Swedish health care sees a diagnosis, not a human being. Political dyna-
mite, not least because the degree of (dis)satisfaction varies between socioeconomic 
groups—the higher the education, the higher the trust, the professors of geography 
and anesthesia the best of friends. Human, all too human. Gustav Vasa echoes back: 
Listen carefully to your masters, be quick to agree and late to question. But there is 
an echo of  The Phenomenology of Mind as well, for
 just as lordship shows its essential nature to be the reverse of what it wants to be, so too, 
bondage will, when completed, pass into the opposite of what it immediately is: being a 
consciousness repressed within itself, it will enter itself, and change around into real and 
true independence. (Hegel, 1807/ 1967 , p. 237) 
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 Hegel’s remarks notwithstanding, the empirical truth remains: The values of the 
strong today are metamorphosed into the facts for the weak of tomorrow. The point 
is not that the Swedish welfare state  is a tragedy but that it is  structured like a trag-
edy: everything beautifully right in the beginning, everything horribly wrong at the 
end, no one to blame in between. To understand human action is therefore not to 
blame but to see that actors are so entrenched in their roles that they take the shadow 
play for reality and reality for the play. It is indeed an integral part of all internal 
relations (logic and money being paradigmatic examples) that we obey their com-
mands without hearing them and without knowing where they come from. And for 
that reason I am eternally grateful that I was born in Per Albin Hansson’s Sweden 
and not in Adolf Hitler’s Germany or Joseph Stalin’s Soviet Union. But this fortu-
nate circumstance must not keep me from realizing that everything comes with a 
price, the politics of the welfare state included. For instance: How do I insult a 
power which is so powerful that it is faceless? How do I learn about difference when 
difference is defi ned away? How do I topple a regime that has no statues erected in 
its honor? How do I fi nd my way in a jungle of paragraphs? How do I live in a cul-
ture so proud of its penis that it is unaware of its Phallus? Why is it so hard to detect 
the relations between the  Nom-du-Père and the  Non-du-Père ? 
 Servitude and (in)equality exposed, King Oedipus blood-soaked before us.
 ***  
 On my reading, Sophocles’  Oedipus Tyrannus (ca. 440 BC) is a paradigmatic 
example of Bertrand Russell’s theory of proper names and defi nite descriptions, his 
formula for how a given statement can at the same time be both true and informa-
tive. And in this sense the tragedian and the atheist are alike that both were driven 
to truth by their ignorance of truth, their engagements a relentless pursuit of knowl-
edge no matter where it would lead them. From beginning to end a struggle with 
tautology, the latter by defi nition always true but never informative. 
 In the play’s prologue, Oedipus, the king with the swollen foot, he who once had 
saved the city from the sphinx, is asked to become what he had once been before. In 
the petitioner’s words:
 You are not one of the immortal gods, we know; 
 Yet we have come to you to make our prayer 
 As to the man surest in mortal ways. 
 [Once], years ago, with happy augury, 
 You brought us fortune; be the same again! 
 (Sophocles, trans.  1949 , pp. 4–5) 
 On this occasion the charge is to save the city from the plague. But whereas solving 
the riddle of the Sphinx had led him to the dignity of man, solving the problem of 
the plague will take him to himself. In his search he is pushed to truth by his blind-
ness to truth, and, when he fi nally sees it, he blinds himself, thereby to see more 
clearly. At the end he saved the city but destroyed himself, neither result on purpose, 
even though everything started with a purpose. All is fate, except that each step 
along the way could have been avoided. Freedom and necessity are mixed, the 
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forces of certainty and ambiguity embracing each other. In the beginning everything 
is right, in the end it shall all be wrong. Be the same again! 
 Once the stage has been set, the crucial question: “Who were my parents?” The 
chorus replies:
 Bewildered as a blown bird, my soul hovers and can not fi nd 
 Foothold in this debate, or any reason or rest of mind. (Sophocles, trans.  1949 , p. 25) 
 After a row of excruciating interrogations, the bewildering ambiguities fi nally 
spring into unquestionable certainty. When that happens Jocasta can no longer con-
tain herself, no longer equate the name “Oedipus” with any of the alternative 
descriptions, “my king,” “my husband,” “father of my children.” First praying “May 
you never learn who you are!” she cries out:
 Ah, Miserable! 
 That is the only word I have for you now. 
 That is the only word I can ever have. (Sophocles, trans. 1949, p. 56) 
 In the new context any other word would be false. And she exits into her apartment, 
her hair clutched by the fi ngers of both hands, closing the doors behind her. A long 
scene later, when also Oedipus has convinced himself that logic had run its course 
and that all his premonitions had been right, he breaks the door open and rushes in. 
As a messenger reports,
 And there we saw her hanging, her body swaying 
 From the cruel cord she had noosed about her neck. 
 A great sob broke from him, heartbreaking to hear, 
 As he loosed the rope and lowered her to the ground. 
 I would blot out from my mind what happened next! 
 For the King ripped from her gown the golden brooches 
 That were her ornament, and raised them, and plunged them down 
 Straight into his own eyeballs, crying, “No more, 
 No more shall you look on the misery about me, 
 The horrors of my own doing! Too long you have known 
 The faces of those whom I should never have seen, 
 Too long been blind to those for whom I have been searching! 
 From this hour go in darkness!” And as he spoke, 
 He struck at his eyes—not once, but many times; 
 And the blood spattered his beard, 
 Bursting from his ruined sockets like red hail. (p. 67) 
 Millennia later we keep returning. And as times go by, as they eventually did for 
Oedipus too, we come gradually to understand that in every already there is always 
a not yet, in every not yet always an already. Finding out who he was may or may 
not have rid the city of the plague; Sophocles never bothered to say. What he did tell 
us, though, is that at the crossroads, the place where Laïos was killed, nobody knew, 
in the palace, where the truth was revealed, nobody rejoiced. Honesty is in pursuit 
and pursuit in tragedy, life itself a game of dice played by men and watched by gods. 
 As the tragic hero eventually understood and accepted, whatever fate there is we 
bring onto ourselves. To do otherwise would be to be dishonest to oneself, to break 
the rules of one’s own game, to be utterly lost. In the long run that is impossible. For 
everyone is one with his own map.
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 ***  
 And for that cartographic reason I must now briefl y turn to the sculpture  Mappa 
Mundi Universalis (Olsson,  2007 , pp. 411–437; Jensson,  2015 ; see also Jensen, 
 2012 ), in the same expression a mapping of power-and-knowledge and a self- 
referential presentation of the fi x-points, sight lines, and projection planes of under-
standing, in every respect the joint effort of myself and my friend and former student 
Ole Michael Jensen. So close was in fact our cooperation that in the end we reported 
our fi ndings not under our individual names but under the amalgamated imprint of 
Gunnael Jensson. Seemingly not a map at all, just a tetrahedron of transparent glass 
grown out of a square slab of granite (Fig.  4.1 ). Not much, yet enough to last us for 
a lifetime.
 To understand why, imagine how a long time ago a drama was set in motion. The 
stage-fl oor is a fl at rock that gently slopes into the sea, the actors some strange crea-
tures that emerge out of nowhere, aimlessly spreading across the homogeneous 
plain. A foot gets stuck in a crevice and for the fi rst time ever there is a difference 
different enough to make a difference. The others notice, they point and they mutter, 
every gesture an attempt to force the bothering difference into graspable identity. 
An event of tremendous consequences, for what we are now about to witness is the 
very fi rst sacrifi ce,  the act through which the indefi nable creatures are changed into 
human beings, a species whose individuals are held together and kept apart by their 
use of signs, every sign an ironic expression of Signifi er and signifi ed merged into 
one. 
 When the foot is pulled out of the rock, a well of blood springs up, a constant 
reminder of what happened when the original deviance was turned into a nonwilling 
scapegoat, the baring of the navel of what it means to be human. In the materialized 
 Fig. 4.1  Gunnael Jensson, 
 Mappa Mundi Universalis . 
Glass tetrahedron on 
granite base, 25 × 25 × 
19¼ in. Mixed media 
(Kalmar granite, 
Weissglass, gold, ruby). 
Museum Gustavianum, 
Uppsala. First exhibited in 
the Uppsala Cathedral, 





version of Jensson’s sculpture, the place of this remarkable event is shown by a red 
ruby, a godly symbol which in the accompanying text is called  a. Not because it  is 
 a but because the semiotic animal must call it something. 
 In the defi nitional struggle that now follows the mute difference is transformed 
into a set of communicable identities, like every translation an act of violence. More 
precisely, the foot in the crevice splits into a trinity of reformulations, a set of pro-
visional reincarnations that in due course, and after much swirling around, fi nd their 
positions in the corners of an equilateral triangle. Subsequently, each of the cor-
nered aliases adopts a name that refl ects the pain with which it was born: the shad-
owy  a ; the tautological  a = a , the informative  a = b . Atoms of understanding 
captured in a mushroom cloud of perpetual fi ssion. 
 When the tension reaches its limit, the rock bursts and out of the lava grows a 
glass tetrahedron, a crystal palace sometimes known as the crucible of man, some-
times as the prison house of language. The fl oor and the three walls of this enchant-
ing structure are all built as equal-sized equilateral triangles, the walls transparent, 
the foundation sunk into the granite ground, the ruby-covered well at its center. In 
a twist of cultural survival, the three reformulations ( a ,  a = a ,  a = b ) now rise from 
the base, stretch upwards, and meet again at the tetrahedron’s top, the multitudes 
of Greek polytheism converging in the singularity of Abrahamic monotheism. 
Like every mapping, also this one is a triangulation, the  a and its three restate-
ments coming together in the vanishing point of the pinnacle, the locus of a tauto-
logical entity that by defi nition is what it is— a = a = b —a contradictory 
condensation of difference and identity, God’s name (if a name it is). And from its 
inception this Absolute speaks.  Let there be! And there is. A universe fl owing out 
of the creator’s mouth, in James Joyce’s conception a commodious vicus of (p)
recirculation. 
 In the coolness of the evening, the utterer listens back to what he has heard his 
tongue say, claiming fi rst that it is very good, then that he alone has the right to 
judge. Tolerating neither idols nor false prophets, he declares that all usurpers will 
be killed and that every critique will be censored. Hereafter, there shall be neither 
pictures nor stories, hence no maps either. Impressed by his own achievements, he 
proclaims a day of rest, a Sabbath without work, 24 h devoted to the glorifi cation of 
himself and his faithful. 
 Such is the subjection of subjects. Such is the structure of power. Such are the 
techniques by which we are made so obedient and so predictable.
 *  
 The crystal palace is a well-guarded castle, its ruling resident the tyrant of tyrants. 
Admittedly a rhetorical exaggeration, for no Absolute is absolutely absolute, no 
crook crooked enough to live on forever. 
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 But the palace is also a marvelous movie theater, one projector in each of the 
basement corners, golden rays carrying the alternative translations from the machine 
rooms to the screens of the opposite walls: the glass of Marcel Duchamp’s  La 
mariée mise à nu par ses célibataires, même (1914) (The Bride Stripped Bare by 
Her Bachelors, Even); the limestone wall of Plato’s cave; the wood panel of Fra 
Angelico’s  Annunciation; all found again in the  mappa of cartographic reason. And 
when the projections of the imagined identities hit the sheets of glass, they miracu-
lously change into a set of Peircean signs, no longer the private fantasies of their 
inventor but communicable bits in an evolving discourse. To be technical, the  a 
becomes the symbol of  a , the  a = a the icon of  a = a , the  a = b the index of  a = b . 
But just as the painter’s canvas must be properly prepared for the paint not to crack 
or run off, so must our minds be indoctrinated to ensure that all that is solid does not 
melt into air. Three grand institutions have risen to the task: religion (with its belief 
in the  a of shared conventions), art (with it’s  a = a striving for perfect resemblance), 
science (with it’s  a = b , the  as-if knowledge of provisional truth). Each mode of 
understanding entrenched within its own self-supporting power structures, rituals, 
rules, and regulations. 
 If these rituals could be perfectly performed, then the projection lines would 
strike the screening planes at 90° angles, every message going straight back to the 
cornered restatement it came from, nothing learned in the process. But even though 
the Saussurean/Lacanian sign is steeped in mimetic desire, the diverse ontologies of 
Signifi er and signifi ed guarantee that this perpetual urge can never be satisfi ed. 
Hence the fortunate consequence that no translation can ever be perfect. It follows 
that in actuality the inclination of the (en)lightening rays is never  right on and that 
the projections, instead of returning to the original identities unchanged, they begin 
to bounce between the walls. In turn, this slight defl ection means that whatever I 
happen to think, say, and do is never pure and simple but always a nondissolvable 
blend of religion, art, and science. And suddenly I see where the trigger of tragedy 
lies: in the purifying spirit of the right angle, in the hatred of the other which is built 
into the desire of every identity formulation. Hitler’s  Lebensraum, Stalin’s  Gulag , 
the Rwanda genocide, the iconoclastic controversy,  Jyllands-Posten ’s Mohammed 
pictures—all of them variations on the same theme. Murderous is our history, murky 
the connection between knowledge and action. 
 In turn, this analysis explains why for 40 years tragedy has occupied such an 
important place in my own conception of what it means to be human, indeed why I 
take it to be the most insightful of all available conceptions of thought-in-action and 
action-in-thought. The original setting is crucial, for Sophocles—a Janus-like fi gure 
who with one eye was scanning the old, with another was imagining the future—
lived his long life in the abyss between the  mythos of Homer and the  logos of Plato. 
What he then discovered was that the greatest tension of his time lay in the attitudes 
to predicament, for while the archaic poets had taken a person’s social standing to 
refl ect his or her ability to handle contradiction, the new philosophers defi ned 
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 paradox as the greatest threat to the cohesion of human reason, an enemy to be 
fought by all means. As Wittgenstein (1921/ 1961 ) later put it, “without philosophy 
thoughts are, as it were, cloudy and indistinct: its task to make them clear and to 
give them sharp boundaries” (4.112). But in Sophocles’ eyes religion itself was 
nothing but a human invention designed to keep people in place, like other laws 
issued by the humans of the polis, not by the gods of Olympus. 
 In my mind this pre-Christian circumstance explains both why the tragedians 
assigned such a crucial role to the chorus and why the recurring convulsions of the 
late twentieth and early twenty-fi rst centuries are essentially a political crisis, an 
orgy in promises that cannot be kept and therefore should never be given, the elec-
tion results bought with junk bonds issued in the voters’ own names. Whereas the 
problem for the tragedians was the exact drawing of the boundary between the 
humans and the gods, the problem for the postdemocrats is that although all animals 
are equal, some pigs are more equal than the others. In my readings it is exactly 
these relations between religion, arts, and science that permeate also the cascading 
refl ections of writers like Giorgio Agamben, Alain Badiou, Peter Sloterdijk, and 
Slavoj Zizek. Getting crowded is the crystal palace, the prophets moving in.
 ***  
 In the history of the  longue durée , the examples of Swedish welfare, central 
place theory, geography, and planning deserve little but a footnote. Yet they too 
spring from the tension of trust and verifi cation that lies at the heart of European 
culture, perhaps of all cultures, the tales about Oedipus’ foot and Odysseus’ scar 
pulling in one direction, the paragraphs of Moses’ fi rst stone tablet in the other. In 
the cleft in-between hides everything inter-esting, including the scientist’s testable 
theory and operationalized model, in the same breath a reifi ed deifi cation and a dei-
fi ed reifi cation, the potentially informative  a = b turning into the tautological 
 I am who I am . In that context the lawmakers’ grasp of human action as a magic 
game of ontological transformations is truly remarkable: “Thou shalt not make unto 
thee any graven image, or any likeness of any thing that is in heaven above, or that 
is in the earth beneath, or that is in the water under the earth; Thou shalt not bow 
down thyself to them, nor serve them” (Exodus 20:4–5, Deuteronomy 5:8–9, King 
James Version). 
 Well decreed. For in the empirical now-here of the utopian No-where, nothing is 
more inhibiting than our inability to be abstract enough. As Abraham responded on 
his way to the  akedah (Genesis 22:1, King James Version): “Here I am.” And the 
two went on together, world literature’s most pregnant silence. 
 The spiral is closing in, every thought emitting a throw of dice. Hazerdous is the 
hazard. In the Vico-inspired language of Norman O. Brown’s ( 1974 )  Closing Time :
 The true ( verum ) and the made ( factum ) are convertible 
 Verifi cation is fabrication 
 Homo faber 
 Man the forger; at his forge 
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